Japan's Re-emergence in Global Standard-Setting for Emerging Technologies

Introduction : Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (JISC) have, through 2025 and 2026, placed renewed emphasis on international technical standardisation asian instrument of industrial policy. Commentary often describes this as a Japanese “return” to standardisation. That framing is imprecise : Japan has remained a permanent member of ISO and IEC throughout, and JISC has continuously led international standards work since the 1950s. What has changed is the degree of coordination between standardisation policy, patent strategy and market access. This article examines that shift, its implications for Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) and FRAND licensing, and the resulting opportunities for Indian companies collaborating with Japanese manufacturers.

Japan's 2026 Standardisation Strategy

In June 2025, METI announced an initiative to accelerate international standardisation by designating five pilot areas requiring Japanese leadership in coordination with industrial policy: quantum technology, hydrogen and ammonia, bio-manufacturing, data-integration infrastructure, and perovskite solar cells. The quantum pilot has already yielded a concrete outcome: a Japanese convener was elected in October 2025 to lead the principal working group of ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee  on quantum technologies.3 This is a targeted, sector-specific strategy, not a general re-entry into standardisation.

The pilot areas sit alongside continuing contributions elsewhere, including a June 2025 standard for remote support of low-speed automated driving systems. In February 2026, JISC became a CENELEC Companion Standardization Body, a step JISC's Secretary-General linked to standardisation as “a vital tool for the social implementation of emerging technologies and the creation of new markets.” The 2026 focus is best understood as a strategic intensification of practice under the Industrial Standardization Act, not evidence that Japan had withdrawn from ISO or IEC activity.

Standards, Patent Portfolios and Standard Essential Patents

Technical standards frequently incorporate patented technology. Where implementing a standard necessarily requires practising a particular claim, that patent may be classified as a Standard Essential Patent. Because implementers cannot design around an SEP without abandoning compliance, SEPs carry commercial leverage ordinary patents do not automatically possess. A company participating in the committees developing a standard is better placed to align its filing strategy with the emerging specification and to sequence filings and disclosures correctly.

Standards organisations typically require participants to declare patents that are, or may become, essential and to commit to licensing them on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, as occurred under the ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy in the cases discussed below. Patent landscaping and standards mapping, comparing a company's portfolio against draft and adopted standards, helps identify where filings may acquire essentiality before the standard is finalised.

Such a relationship is not to be exaggerated. Just being a member of standards development does not constitute a declaration of essentiality, nor does a declared SEP necessarily be valid or essential, nor does it necessarily be commercially significant. As for patents, it is analytically different for the owner to own patents that are required to implement a widely adopted standard, than to own patents that are not required to implement a widely adopted standard; the latter is what SEP-style leverage is.

Licensing and the Japanese SEP Jurisprudence

Japan's principal contribution to global FRAND jurisprudence is the Intellectual Property High Court's Grand Panel judgment of 16 May 2014 in Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Japan GK. The court held that an SEP holder's exercise of a right to seek an injunction constitutes an abuse of rights under Article 1(3) of the Civil Code where the implementer has demonstrated genuine willingness to obtain a FRAND licence, and that a FRAND declaration is a statement of willingness to license, not an offer capable of unilateral acceptance. This established the abuse-of-rights framework structuring subsequent Japanese SEP litigation.

For over a decade, no Japanese court granted an injunction on a FRAND-committed SEP. That changed on 23 June 2025, when the Tokyo District Court, in Pantech Corporation v Google Japan GK, granted an injunction against the Pixel 7 smartphone for infringing a Pantech LTE-essential patent.  Applying the Grand Panel test, the court found Google Japan's refusal to disclose sales and unit data during court-facilitated settlement, after agreeing to that process, indicated unwillingness to license on FRAND terms.

On 10 July 2025, the Osaka District Court reached the opposite outcome on materially similar facts between the same parties, concerning the Pixel 7a and the same patent. It found Google International had negotiated in good faith and dismissed Pantech's injunction claim. Together the judgments show the abuse-of-rights defence turns on fact-specific assessment of conduct, not on the existence of an SEP declaration alone.

In January 2026, the Tokyo District Court's Intellectual Property Divisions published Guidelines for Patent Infringement Lawsuits Involving Standard Essential Patents. These contemplate a settlement-oriented framework in which parties propose, early in proceedings, a Global FRAND Royalty covering the SEP holder's entire relevant portfolio, using the top-down and comparable-licence methods the court applied in Pantech Corporation v ASUS Japan. A defendant's failure to disclose evidence needed to calculate that royalty may itself indicate unwillingness to license, positioning Tokyo, alongside the JPO's Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents (revised 2022), as a structured forum for multinational SEP disputes.

Standards and Market Access

Technical standards affect market access through conformity assessment, certification and incorporation into national technical regulations. The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade requires members to use relevant international standards as a basis for technical regulations, subject to exceptions, and to avoid measures creating unnecessary obstacles to trade. Standards developed through open, consensus-based processes can reduce transaction costs, improve cross-border interoperability, and increase confidence for regulators and consumers alike. The same standards can operate as barriers to entry: a standard embedding an incumbent's patented technology can require competitors to obtain a licence merely to comply, converting a public standard into a private licensing gateway, and conformity assessment can impose disproportionate compliance costs on smaller manufacturers lacking resources to participate. Japan's pilot-area strategy therefore carries both trade-facilitating and potentially exclusionary effects, depending on how openly the resulting standards are developed.

Opportunities for Indian Companies Collaborating with Japanese Manufacturers

Japan's pilot areas correspond closely to sectors where Indian companies already supply components, software and engineering services: battery materials for electric mobility, sensor and control software for robotics and industrial automation, data-integration platforms for smart manufacturing, and materials inputs for perovskite photovoltaics. An Indian company supplying a software module, process improvement or materials formulation into a Japanese manufacturing ecosystem is, in substance, contributing technology that may later be proposed for standardisation through JISC's participation in ISO and IEC committees, including through the Japan-India Industrial Competitiveness Partnership established in 2021.

This raises contractual questions agreements should address explicitly. Background IP, brought by each party, should be distinguished from foreground or jointly developed IP. Ownership of foreground IP and the right to file patents on it should be agreed before joint development begins, together with control over standards disclosure, since an SEP declaration by one party affects the licensing position of both. If jointly developed technology is an SEP, the SEP must include provisions on FRAND royalty rights, geographical limitation, improvements and subsequent rights, as well as whether the Indian partner can license or litigate in Japan under the Global FRAND Royalty framework.

The appropriate domestic background can be provided by India's Patents Act 1970. Section 48 defines the exclusive rights conferred by an Indian patent, while section 83 records the principle that patents encourage working of inventions in India and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of producers and users.16 The Competition Act 2002, on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance, is relevant where FRAND terms are alleged discriminatory or a refusal to license is alleged to foreclose a market.

A Standards-Engagement Plan for Indian Companies

Stage 1, identify the standards ecosystem: map the relevant ISO, IEC, JIS and BIS committees active in the target technology, and identify which JISC or Japanese industry currently lead.

Stage 2, create a patent and standards map: catalogue existing and proposed standards, identify potentially essential claims within the company's own patent families, and identify competing technologies before the same committee.

Stage 3, decide the open and closed technology strategy: determine which components should be proposed for standardisation to secure interoperability, and which should remain proprietary.

Stage 4, coordinate patent filing and standards participation: ensure patent applications are filed before technical proposals are disclosed, and monitor the applicable IP policy, since disclosure timing rules differ across bodies.

Stage 5, establish licensing architecture: agree in advance how SEP ownership, FRAND royalty calculation, territorial licensing, improvements and enforcement rights will be allocated before any joint patent becomes essential to an adopted standard.

Stage 6, participate institutionally: develop personnel able to represent the company directly within BIS, JISC, ISO and IEC committees, rather than relying solely on partners to represent Indian positions.

Conclusion

Japan's 2026 standardisation policy is not a catch-up phenomenon, since Japan has never abandoned standardisation, but rather a strategic refinement of the connection between the three of standardisation, patent strategy and market access in specific emerging technologies. These two decades of SEP jurisprudence reveal that real, but conditional, leverage exists through standards participation: the question of essentiality and FRAND remains fact specific, requiring the parties to conduct themselves in a specific manner. The goal for Indian companies providing technology to the Japanese manufacturing ecosystems should be to shift from taking the standards, to participating in the standards. The aim should be to get Indian companies from standards takers to standards participants who can influence the specification and negotiate license terms from a knowledgeable position.

Author :- Soumya Gaur, in case of any query, contact us at Global Patent Filing or write back us via email at support@globalpatentfiling.com.

References

1. Japanese Industrial Standards Committee, 'JISC's International Activities' (JISC) https://www.jisc.go.jp/eng/cooperation/index.html  accessed 16 August 2026.
2. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 'Convener from Japan Elected to Lead the Working Group for the International Standardization of Quantum Technologies' (METI, 24 October 2025)  https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2025/1024_002.html  accessed 16 August 2026.
3. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 'Standards and Conformity (International Standards)' (METI) https://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/economy/standards_and_conformity/international_standards.html  accessed 16 August 2026.
4. CEN-CENELEC, 'CENELEC Establishes Closer Links with the Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (JISC)' (CEN-CENELEC, 4 February 2026) https://www.cencenelec.eu/news-events/news/2026/brief-news/2026-02-04-clc-csb-jisc/  accessed 16 August 2026.
5. Industrial Standardization Act (Japan, Act No 185 of 1949).
6. Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu, 'The Japanese Court First Judgment to Grant an Injunction Based on a FRAND-Committed SEP' (NO&T IP Law Update No 16, November 2025) https://www.nagashima.com/en/publications/publication20251021-2/  accessed 16 August 2026.
7. Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Japan GK (Intellectual Property High Court, Grand Panel, 16 May 2014) Case No 2013 (Ne) 10043; WIPO Lex, Japan Judgment Summary https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/judgments/details/2157  accessed 16 August 2026.
8. Pantech Corp v Google Japan GK (Tokyo District Court, 23 June 2025), discussed in Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (n 7).
9. Pantech Corp v Google Japan GK (Osaka District Court, 10 July 2025), discussed in Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (n 7).
10. Intellectual Property Divisions of the Tokyo District Court, Guidelines for Patent Infringement Lawsuits Involving Standard Essential Patents (January 2026); discussed in Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu, 'Publication of the "Guidelines for Patent Infringement Lawsuits Involving Standard Essential Patents" by the Intellectual Property Divisions of the Tokyo District Court' (NO&T IP Law Update No 17, March 2026) https://www.nagashima.com/en/publications/publication20260216-1/  accessed 16 August 2026
11. Pantech Corp v ASUS Japan Inc (Tokyo District Court, 10 April 2025), discussed in Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (n 11).
12. Japan Patent Office, Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents (2nd edn https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/system/laws/rule/guideline/patent/document/rev-seps-tebiki/guide-seps-en.pdf  accessed 16 August 2026.
13. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (WTO, 1 January 1995).
14. Ministry of External Affairs (India), 'India-Japan Bilateral Relations' (MEA, October 2023) https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Japan_-_Bilateral_Brief_MEA_Website_Oct_2023.pdf  accessed 16 August 2026.
15. Patents Act 1970 (India), ss 48, 83.
16. Competition Act 2002 (India), ss 3, 4.